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STATEMENT PRESENTED TO THE 
HOUSE ARMtD SERVICES COMr-:IIT'l'EE ON H • . R. 2967 
A bill to provide f~r strengthening of the Reserve Forces and for other 
purposes. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Comrni ttee: 
I am, Strom Thurmond, National President of the Reserve Officers Association •. 
It is a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before this distinguished group ~ 
to present the views of our Association on the various steps that need to be taken / 
to strengthen the Reserve Forces of our country. In such a program lies the real 
hop:-:;-st-:::gthening our military security programs ~ nd at the same time reducing 
the drain on our e conomyfohich results from the necessity of maintaining a large 
active duty force in being. 
The Reserve Officers Association supports £,_ul~1 ~ he broad ·objectives and 
aspects of the administration's plan/to strengthen the Reserve Forces. It does, 
however, disagree with some of the details of the bill being considered/and also 
certain of the purposes which this bill is designed to accomplish.it 
As I am sure you gentlemen are aware, our Association ,has/ for several years / 
been alarmed at the lack of readiness among the reserves of our armed forces land 
the lack of pro; ress in improving that situation. As evidence of our feelings 
in this matter/ we were delighted · to cooperate with the Congress and the Department 
of Defense in the enactment of the Reserve Forces Act of 1952/which, in our 
opinion, provided the necessary authority antj plan upon which to build an adequate 
reserve. Other legislation-, such as the Selective Service Act . of 1948/ and the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act, also contained significant authorities 
which should have resulted in a much better -reserve structure. For many reasons, 
and certainly there is no need to try to assess responsibility / these laws were 
never utili ~ed to the fullest extent/ and the present \lllacceptable .condi.tion of 
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our reserves is the result. -
way to ~ncrease the number of 
The basic fact remains 
reservists~ ut we must 
that not only must we find a 
find acceptable and equitable 
way·s to insure th~ir articipation in reserve activities, ----........ "'-· -
The Korean episode occurred at a time when our active force s tructure was at 
a low level~and it was imperative that the reserves of the country be utilized, 
Today, we have a substantially larger active force structure of approximately 
three million officers and men~ vhich should change to some degree~he need to use 
reservists for so-ca]led olice type -wars. On the other hand; . 
our world wide commitments have also increase t~, perhaps, proportionally a higher 
level. Stated differently, the deployment of our armed forces and the world vd. de 
nature of the threat which faces us1has placed a greater requirement for manpower 
on our active serviees1and, therefore1itmaywell be that the size of our military 
structure toda,y, in relation to the Jr oblems it must .face, is no fflG* than the 
size of our military structure 'rto Korea and its problems at that time. 
It should also be noted that numbered among the ive forces today /are ever 
f. a million reserve officers and man thousands of enlisted men. Many 
have served cm active duty continuously since 1940. Therefore, in no sense of t he 
... t .. • rt tmr+1 
word1ean they be considered/ as a part of a reserve force~ esigned to back up the 
active forces at this time or in the foreseeable future. ·-
considered for ~ purposes/ as career officers and men. 
Rather
1
they must be 
It will be argued by some/ that never abain will we need to call on the reserves 
for small wars/ because of the lar · active 1: q .,S handling such problems-. Oll this 
thesis, the next time our reserves are neededft t will be in an all-out war follow-
ing the probable use of nuclear weapons against our homelanJith its terrific and 
unique problems for our military/ as well as non-military security structure.. This 
concept is dangerous/ and is strongly questioned by our Association. -
Recognizing these problems, and with a complete sense of discouragement as to 
the current status of the reserve, we created within the Reserve Officers 
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Association/ a .Committee :0f extremely com etent officers 
from a~l services, headed by Brig~ General Wendell Westover of ~lbany, New York. 
This Committee was directed ~o -s .tudy all facets of this problem/and to b r~ng forth 
in general terms/a plan which oo uld. serve as a basis for our Associat;i.on ts position 
in the steps being taken to improve our reserve .·structure. It "reported on 
February 6, 195.51 to our National Council and Executive Commit,te.e, .as well .as to 
the members of the s eveJrf tJrvice sections assembled in Washington, fn _?a~t!_ for 
the receiving of this report. It has also been distributed to our membership 
generally for comment and suggestion. The Committee had the benefit of mu.ch of 
the thinking that had gone on within the D~fense ·nepartment · and the Office of 
Defense Mobilization, and/ in .·rrry opinionh1as competently met the difficult problems 
presented to it. 
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, I must call your attention to the wonderful 
cooperation t hat now exists~between these tw~ government agencies and our 
organization . The Association has been proud of the opportunity given it to work 
with them/in considering the various aspects of the reserve problemfohich led to 
the legislation pr~sently before you. We ·reel that this Committee shpuld know of 
our high opinion~ f the diligent effort and intelligent leadership that ·has been 
given to this problem~ y the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Manpower . and 
Personnel, Mr. Carter L. Burgess, and the Director of the .Office of Defense 
Mobilization, Dr. ArJ,hur s. Flemming. V!e feel that they are to be complimen.ted 
on evolving a platform on v.hich, with certain modification, we believe a proper 
reserve can be developed. 
The Association plan, predicated on our Committee Report, is not intended to 
be a substitute for the · Department · of Defense recommendations, but rather provides 
an and a more · eed implementation~ f . cert~in aspects of their 
program. Vte have attached to our statement a copy of this report/ and request it . be 
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be designed to indicate ..h2!{ the bilJ. presently before us/needs to .. be modified in 
bill, as introduced:., 
but to s::,lve more certainly the problems which led to its introductiQn. 
Mr.o Chairman, it is difficult to establish the propers artin point for our 
more detailed comments. I feel I have two choicest Ii ther the size of the reserve 
J .,-- ' 
structure which it is designed to create/ or the individuals who will be in the 
program. 
The bill before you is1 in essence, a manpower procurement bilJtealing 
primarily ,v.i.th the problem of securing enlisted manpower for the reserves!"'and 
effecting a higher degree in partici ation in the reserve training programs •. Wh!le 
we believe that these are onl; ~ :lements of the problem facing us today/we will 
start our disc uesi on with the t e of individual that we believe should be in the 
reserve. 
This Association is in acoord with the concept/that j.V~;fl able-bodi~d, malex 
.American owes, as an obligation of citizenship~ a certain amount of ervice to · the 
Military, This is service either with the active forces, the rese:g:ve forces, or in -
~ombiru:i.ti,q,tt, thereof. It does ~ agree A hat thiS?Jtrriod of obligatory service 
should exceed eight years. Fur•thermore, it feels that this period of qbligation / 
should be subject to reduction by the Presidenth,hen force levels ha~e been reached 
in the !.,Ct~~ forces and in the expanded reserveA.n order that the manpower pool 
may not increase~eyond the !!!Rm~. figure necessary to provide a source of . · · 
military establishment. Failure to hold the manpower 
result in many young men escapi~ service, . and the 
average a e of inductees increasing to · unacceptable figures • 
• be tw~ and two;t only .. 
The first sourse/would be from &.;.;;;.;;.;.-. ..... ....-c.,.e personnel with remaining periods 
of obligatory servic~ or,. those who have . 2tschst&e<\. .. l!J~!r obli_&,_ator s eryiceiwn o 
- 'f -
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can be induced to remain in the rese~ on a voluntary Lt>a~s. The s;e9,p_<:J .. sfJ,Pfz$.e / 
wou.::i..d be ~on-prior s,:r~c;: men who enlist in .~he re.~erve component~ thfoughout the 
count,ry /and irmnediately thereafter-" go on active duty for training for a ;period of 
six months. After this training is completedAhey then return to their reserve 
uni ts for a period of seven and one-b~lf years. .ij;. servie_es s~-be. .!..:_qui::~ 
to use _'49;1¢h methods;. The numbers who would be trained/wou).d be the maxim~ · 
consistent with the existence of facilities and available funds. It shou+d be 
. ·~: ...... ,, .· .. ~ · 
noted that the Department of Defense recommends this traiinin,g plm be on a 
carefully controlled basi s
1
and1it is our understanding., intends it to apply _only ~ 
the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. It should l:e noted that under 
their i?res~nt progra:mAhe Navy· is following a somewhat simi~.?1' p~anfohich th~y ._call ..... . · . . . " - . . . ', . 
"Accelerated Reservists Trainingn. Consistent with the position stated above, we 
recommend that a floor be placed under the number that would be trained py this . 
method, and that ::- floor would be 120.,000 trained ~ually/ror all t _he mil_i tary - - ....... · .. 
services.. It should be borne in mind that this floor reprei:;ents only 75,000 man . 
years of trainee/which should not tax the traini.!lr facilities of the military 
establishmentAo a si. gnificant: degree• 
The size of the reserve~s the next logical point to discuss. -
The bill before you establishes a total of five milli~n men in the ~serve~, 
divided between a _3,000,000 man re-defined Ready Feserve and a 2,000,000 m.an 
re~defined Standby Reserve. 
It is the opinion of the Asro ciation that the total resel"'.ve should consist of 
approximately t,2:ee mill~o,e. ·reservists. We would :recommend th.at the three rnilli.on 
Ready Reserve, a3 recormnended in this legislation., be the total reserve and that . the 
. . . . 
Standby Reserve as recommended in this legislation, re.vert to: ·the general manpower 
pool. The Standby R'ese:rve, .a s recommended _in this bill, . can not· be or_deredt to ---· . " ' . . . . . : .,--
active duty/except with the-~approval of _the ~~-lect~ ~ervi.9£l • . furthermore,. this 
bill provides no opportuni~; f~r training in the S.tandby Reserye~cept on a . 
. --. .. ..,. as, . . , .. ·. ·. , ...· .. 
volunteer, unpaid basis/and offers no . oppo~t~itr. ~o_r ~r9}}!_21i~ or advan~ememt to 
-S-
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allkd adds nothi~~ its members .. It is our opinion that it ts not a reserve at -
to the securitz of our country, 
The Association would not change the present definitions contained in the 
RP.ssr:e Forces Act of 1952 for the Ready, Standby, and Inactive reserves, al though 
we woi.lld suggest changing the name of the Standbz Reserve to "Mobilization Reserv~ 
A careful study of these existing definitions shows clearly that they accomplish 
precisely the same objectives as the new definitions suggested by the Department 
of Defense~ th the exception of the control by Selective Service over the 
proposed "Standb;:r'.' Reserve"• 
The main difference between our positions is one of size.. The Association - -
would divide the three:. million men in the Ready Reserve, as recommended by the 
Department of Defense; into a Readr, Standby, and Inactive Reserve/as established 
by present law• The ~SflQY Reserve vrould be the only part ?f ihe reserve/which 
would be subjeet to the call of the President. In -our opinion this ·should not 
exceed OM cmd a half million men. It will be noted in the Associqtion plan/ 
attached hereto/that the million and a half in the Jteadz Reserve would be divided 
into two groups of similarly trained and equipped units and individuals. · The -
first would be a so-called "Hurricane" force, the second, -the "Support" force. 
Now, Mr. Chairman, the term "Hurricane force" is not intended to be a legal 
term but is rather a descriptive term-. This force, backed up by the "Support" 
force~ ith only a sli~htly less degree of i~ediate readines/would constitute our 
~ Reserve. Membership in this IIHurricane" force and "Supi:,ort," force would be 
encouraged by s ecial ~nducP..Inents and incentives, includin~but not limitedx to1 
extra emoluments, identif ·ng and distinctive .unifo:r ~ 0. markers, and priority 
receipt of full combat e uipment and· realistic training facilities. To the 
greatest ext~nt possibl/;t would be manned by ;~;:rvi;~;e·;sc~ho would be 
induced to serve in the Ready Reserve force. This Ready Reserve wcu.ld be subject -
to the call of the President. 
- ~ -
The balance of the three mi_llion total re.serve w ould be in the Standbz. 
Reserve/end would be organized,_ equipped, and traine<J, precisely the same as the 
R n:;i,-ly He serve. rt would have , .11!:?e;'!;eJ , .. a l ~ e:i:_ d~~re2, .. 2£. gt.i,2.rjj,;r ~ i evini -
pre~~t~ona adiness. 
It, :~s the belief of the Asso~iationfehat everything po;:;sible should be done t o 
put the s a-called "Hurricane" forceA.nto a high de ree of readiness at 
pra~t:i.cab~: _d~· .. We would put a target date of ~Y l.222. for completion of 
organizing, equipping and starting of intensive training. _ 
As previously indicated we would call the reserve, other than those in the 
Ready reserve, a "Mobilization Reserve" instead of a "Standby Reserve~', This· is · a. 
much more d~e£r~pti~ title~articularly since it can only be called to duty, for 
other . than training, by the Congress. 
We know that it will re argued that a }...ar
1
g!f Ready Reserve is requir.ed, but we 
believe that such a concept, as expressed in the legislation before you, stems f~om 
war plans designed to meet the requirements of full mobilization. :it is recognized 
that the next war may start, by an all-out attack on our country. That, of course, 
would bring in all reseryesh rith the fullest support of the Congress, . 
However, we cannot accept 1'.concept/ that we should t;ie our ready reserve 
structure t o a plan/ that would require the use of 3,000,000 menA n ~ddition to_ .?ur . 
active f orces. There may be ~ t y-pes .· of small wars/which will re~uire ·a 
partial mobilization on a very urgent basis. If such is the case, a relati~ly . 
small Ready Reserve is -
needed, then it is our 
there will not be such 
imperative. . . 
opinionfehat 
damage/that 
If, however~ the entir~ three million iEr 
such a need/s tems .from ~9~1 wa:r. Certainly/ 
tne Congress could not take any action necessa:ry;. 
to permit the use of all reserves. 
The Association supports the ·c~ncept of developing ~-~h~d,~A o en~orce 
· a · on in reserve tra:j..ning. . It is in aocord with plans to p: riodic~ll 
order to :ctiv,: duty, against their wi,11, 1:.hose reservists who do not participate 
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in training actiVJ.'1,:1.es l.,l 9,1.·uer to D1q.:1.1r~d.in tne:i..r readine~s. FUrthermore, it, 
supports the concept that re$erves who entered . the· progltain thro~h- the six-months 
training methodhiust participate actively in reserve tr;iining~ ;Failure to meet 
the requir~ standards,lshould result in t~at reservist being ordered to active 
duty/ by the appropriate Secretar~ concerriedfror an add;i.t,+QP@J- pe~i.od of .2h, ~. 
This is not a ~unitiY§!. measure. The decision to enter the reserves through the 
si:>:-S9J1t~ route /was a vo~unta~7 choice/ on the part of the individual. ~f, at a 
later time, he changes his mind and decides not to carry out his original plan~e --
merely reverts to the service he had originally rejected. The Department of 
Defense only recommends,4,hat such reservists become liable for induction for an 
additional 18 mon:tll§, We feel he should asslllle the same degree of service/which 
l Wl1 ........... . 
he had previously elected to reject. 
The Association also recommends that this proposed reserve legislation~ e 
amended to include specific authori tyh or twel v~ weekend training periods vi th the 
pay equivalent of kB ~.~lJ...s. It is possible that this can be done administra~i!~~, 
but that a congressional directive as expressed in law for such training, where 
appropriate, would do ~ to improve the degree of readiness of all uni ts /and 
particularly those 
While it has been previously stated, it is believed to be necessary for 
emphasis, to repeat that members of the recommended ~.Qpiljzati.Q.p Reserve, or as is 
presently called the Sta~ Reserve, with the exception of those who are on the -
Inactive duty list,. should be organized, equipped, ancl trained in precisely the 
same way as those in the Ready Reserve. · The only difference between the ttRea " --------- ,..._ ....... ..._.,......._ _____ __ 
thes.e arrangements / 
_,... 
and "Mobilization" Reserve would be i 
The Association concurs in the theory of constantly screening the reserves, 




. / .. , 
domestic economy. Howeve1: ,. . it is noted in the bill/as introduc~d/that there is a 
. . . . 
provision contained on page 19, line 7,. subsection (d), which would permit an 
appro!)riate Secretary to di.sqharge !Dl member of the reserve component ho is in 
ex~cs s of mobilization requirements in any category of skill or qualifications. 
The Associati~n believes that~ sectio~ must be re~ised~o m~e certain/ that 
such separations are made onJl to implement the program of pre>tecti.n_i essential 
skills in industry. In its present -formA ~ is too broad a:d _too ,general /to do 
other than cause concern. 
One of the major deficiencies in the bill under discussion t as its fai"lure ·to-
recognizeA he absolute need to provide for an orderly flow of oun · rese:e "" 
officers into the reserve program. We are pleased to note from the testimony of 
Mr. Burgess/that he intends to recommend amendments to ~0rrect this omission. 
Basically, such officers c.ome into the Reserve through the ROTC program, Under· 
present conditions/ the purposes of this program have been distorted to become a 
procurement programfror the needs of the active services. The pr$,mary purpose of 
the ROTC progr;~ s to provide YOUQ~ officers to meet mobilization requirements.,. 
The Association feels that this bill should include specific authority and.: 
direction~ hat . the ~ program be re-designed to meet its established mission/to 
provide the · officer personnel for mobilization requirements. We recommend that · 
the num~rs in the program be consist~nt with that objective/ and that wion 
graduation all ROTC graduates .will be commissioned • . Those in excess of mobilization 
requirements,4rill be orde.red to active quty for · training ~or. si~ month/ and then 
~
attached to reserve uni ts for a period of seven and one-half years obligatory · 
service. 
There is much talk of induceme1:1t.s and incentives to improve interest in 




of reservists. The Association has · a strong and fundamental 
substantial . part ·.; the present ~ -morale. and f"'f! efficienc of the 
from certain $!Si.J.1 oorrectible faults on the part of the i:esul~ 
There ha~., in the . p~s~, :llot. ·beell an, acceptance of the concept 
- r-
by a part of the re ular establishment!t~a~ -the reserves are an iq~e£r,a part of 
our ~ military structure fond not a mere adJur;iat, to the ref/iuJ..~ establishment• 
This has resulted, unfortunately, in discrimination and ·attitudes,' particularly 
in personnel procedures, which can only ind;i.cate that~ n the minds of !2.~ regula:r 
personnel /a reservist is a S!;,corid: cl.~~ member of the military team. 
Therefore, the Association believes that -~ora}~ can only be soundly improved / 
when~ relatively simple, but perhaps difficult to ·· achieve, criteria are ·met. _ 
First: We must, through every device possible, so educate every · 
American to accept the concep/that .there · is .an obligation 
of citizenship on the part of each Arnerican~o support our 
security programs, in general, a_nd that every able-bodied 
American of appropriate ag/ owes ~.&h.t years of obligatory 
service to the military. 
Second: The services must give each ind;ividual such progressive and ··· 
worthwhile trainingfi,hat he will believe that what he is 
doing is worthwhile;:nd that it is a proper discharge of this 
citizenship obligation. 
Third: The services must develop and constantly maintain proper 
systems of adminis·trationho provide equitable procedures 
for prtmotion, retirement, pay, etc. , and 
Fourth, · The reservist must be recognized as an important part of, 
and not an adjunct to, our military establishment~ nd be. 
treated accordingly. 
If these criteria are met, tne details of the incentives and inducements become 
easier to accomplish. For example, they might take the form of certain additional 
paymentsh or the signing of a contract to insure active and continued service in 
the reserve, or a discharge of their eight years of obligatory service at an 
accelerated ratei by service· on active duty/or for participa~ion in the Ready . 
-/0-
reserve as distinct from the Mobilization (standby) reserve •. There are many 
relatively lnexoensive methods that can be developed/to make an individtial anxious 
e.nd willing to serve in the reserve g, a whole• . 
The Association has a furth3 r sUgt estion to make •. We recognize that this 
bill was primarily designed to solve the enlisted manpower procurement program •. 
"' 
We have already suggested a broadening of this conce~t/ although we have also 
indicated that we believe there is little need to change much of the existing iaw 
dealin6 with the reserves. We feel, however, that this bill, which in the eyes 
of the I-,e ople will be labeled as the "National Reserve Plan" for some other 
dis tine ti ve title, should solve some of the other }J'Oblems which have impeded the 
reserves in various ways under existing law, 
Therefore, we recommend the addition of a new title to the bill~ nto llhich 
will be placed some of the various bits of legislation presently before the 
Congress, to the end that when this bill is· enacted /we will have cleaned tip a· 
great many of the legislati~~ problems that presently are disturbing us. BY way 
I 
of example, we su~est that this new title include rehabilitation a for · reserves 
on continuous active duty~ o ar~ separated ~in. v. o. l;..Q~_,,,~ due to reductions in 
fore/after long tours of crntinuous active duty. There is a plan, which has 
already been submitted to your staff, which has approval within the Department of· 
Defense, and is designed to cushion the shock of the separation of these 
individuals whi n fact~ ave been career employees for periods extending up to 19 
years on active 
Similarly, 
duty. 
there is a question of broken service for SPARS and WACS ~which 
¥ • ti $ 
for some time/ and which ~ ould be resolved, 
Another matter v.hich we earnestly recommend for the consideration of the 
Committee, is the fact that we should endeavor to clean up - once and for all 
the problem of reservists who have served on continuous active duty for such 
periods of time that they, in fact1have become career personnel, We are constantly 
- II-
recommending bi ts and pieces of legislation designed to correct ia,equi ties '?hi ch 
result from this problema 
Without such re~ervists, the armed forces cannot possib\y meet their 
commitments. Over 80% of the officers of the Air Force and Army on active duty ~ 
are reservistso Smaller percentages prevail in the Navy and Marine Corps.· We 
know of no line of endeavorh,,here an employee who works for the same employer for 
a period of~, ~1J~e~~, or twent years~s not considered a c::::r employee. 
Yet these reserve officers/who are holding :esponsible posi tkns on g.p~iX~ duty / 
and are as well qualified as the so-called regular, who frequently has had the 
same education and the same type of service training · and record as the reservist/ 
are E.2.!:, 11 career11 men. . Human nature being what it is/the r,es~rvi,~t on active duty / 
is constantly being discriminated against~n matters of promotion, command 
assignment, retirement, etc. 
Therefore, we suggest to this Committee~hat an amend~ent be .written into this · 
Reserve legislation~to provide that, except in time of war or general mobilization, 
when a reserve has been on continuous active duty for a period of ei§h~ years~hat 
he will at that time be screened for fitness to be retained on active duty. If he 
is deemed to be fit for retention~e willl::.e given the opportunity to be integrated 
in his present rank and status. This will solve a great many of the problems which 
now plague us all~nd it cert~inly will bring about a higher degree of morale and 
efficiency~n the part of individuals who have been living under the shadow of 
forces beyond their control. 
There are undoubtedly other items of this type which should be considered/and 
the Association earnestly urges that this be done • . 11e do not believe that they -
will jeopardize the passage of the bill as a whole. Similarly, we do not feel ·-
j~r:f'~ ~ ... 
that the discussions which involve the :~~R>~ ...... th-:i:&,,•biii~- a,-,w~,e,, will 
. Jl«t'~~~~., el~ J:J...ftl, ~ 0-, ,µ.A•~ -
slow dowh the ~ass.ag&.-oe ~se,,~,tems. . In fact/we believe that the presence of a 
,rounded program with a g,le,~~ ,of existing defects/will ,~mqqH~ the way for prompt 
- / al.-
f ' 
Congressional approval of this legislation. 
In closing, I want to reaffirm our Association's beliefA hat the enactment 
of reserve legislation A,o accomplish the objectives set out in the Department of 
Defense bill, is essential. '!'he amendments we have suggested are constructive., 
and will, in our opinion, give us the type of reserve that the Department of 
Defense needs to meet their obligations. 
We hold firmly to the beliefA,hat the m~m-~~ number of personnel should 
be placed under the control of the President/and that the !!l~J~H:'.il-1 of t he , 
reservists should be subject only to the will of the people/speaking through the 
Congress. 
We believe that the real heart of the improvement in our Reserve Progra/;s 
in the development of realistic training/ supported by proper facilities~ t the 
earliest possible date. Along with this broad plan should go a crash progr.~ / 
to bring the p.e:3-,(]y Reserve, as outlined in our plan, to a J;u.£tl degree, of 
readiness ~ t the earliest possible moment. · 
It is our sincere belief that/as our reserve improves/ we can have ~?I;.:fi<!~9S.e 
in its readiness. It should then be possible to more safely reduce the 
~:::blishment~ ithout jeopardizing our country's security, our 
THANK YOU 1 
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